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The cause of the 2008 crisis has not been the inability to deal with extreme greed, but the inability to deal with extreme abundance. In the past, societies have fallen into deep crises mainly due to endemic scarcity, but nowadays they have proven to be incapable of dealing with abundance.

Abundance is the distinctive quality of North American and Western European contemporary history. This prosperity is closely related to the validity of freedoms and equalities. However, how are abundance and institutional strength related? In extreme scarcity, the (complete) absence of goods tautologically implies the absence of property rights. After extreme scarcity comes the emergence of trade and division of labour brought about the need to define property rights. Although the positive relationship between prosperity and well-defined property rights is evident, the appearance of abundance has reformulated how we perceive freedom (or to be more precise, how we perceive the validity of individual freedom): oddly enough, once modern societies achieve high levels of prosperity, they seem to agree to tolerate a marginal loss of freedom. 

This dangerous inverse relationship between prosperity and institutional weakness explains part of the current European crisis. But it mainly explains a central problem emerging economies have encountered since the beginning of the century: in Europe, prosperity has brought about  a marginal questioning of rights, but in emerging economies like China, Russia, India, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, it is agreed that economic growth must pay (or must be willing to pay) the price of the violation of some civil and political rights.

This is where the validity of the European project is unshakeable. Europe is still the one place in the West where the noble liberal tradition coexists with the noble social democratic tradition in (at times) strained but virtuous harmony.

The perception of abundance marginally but systematically weakens property rights because actors assume that there is a diminishing value in defining each marginal unit of income. This  dynamic has been conceptualized in the “rent-seeking society” developed by Buchanan, Tullock, and Krueger, among others. Then, the unprecedented level of abundance has had an impact not only on the poor efficiency of distributive policies but also on the poor efficiency of the defense of freedoms.


1)	The Era of Abundance

As mentioned above, abundance has been the distinctive economic quality of most of the world over the last decades. Consequently, the historical tension between “freedom” and “equality” that defined innumerable societies up to mid-twentieth century has been reformulated thanks to the “solutions” brought about by abundance. However, abundance has created not only solutions but also “problems.” 

The following graph shows a preliminary approach to this “Era of Abundance.” As of the twentieth century, there has been a radical qualitative change in the population’s availability of goods and services.

Graph Number 1: Global growth in Real GDP Per capita, year 1000 to present





Abundance has created obvious possibilities for fighting poverty, malnutrition, or infant mortality, among other problems that affected societies in traditional economies, where scarcity was the norm. However, the irruption of abundance brought about a new twist in political challenges and problems that were already present in traditional societies. One of the problems that has a radical new twist thanks to the irruption on abundance is the tension between “freedom” and “equality.” For example, many countries experience a high correlation between poverty and corruption, between poverty and dictatorship, and between poverty and the absence of division of powers. Furthermore, according to the Human Development Index created by United Nations Development Program, the poorest countries in the world are African, and according to the World Bank’s Governance Program, the same countries have the weakest and most ineffective institutional framework. 

Therefore, and as long as we consider poverty a dimension of the concept of “scarcity,” it is clear that poverty contributes to the weakness, ineffectiveness, or absence of efficient checks and balances mechanisms. At this point we could ask the –in a sense -inverse question: Is it possible to state that under specific circumstances, abundance creates just as many problems for and threats to an efficient definition of property rights as scarcity does?


How have this specific abundance and freedom been related?   Abundance implies, ceteris paribus, the possibility of redistributing more than when there is scarcity. As societies become wealthier, they become less tolerant of the absence of certain public policies that aim to end, for instance, extreme poverty. Contemporary societies have accepted an increase in fiscal pressure and government size as they became wealthier. This is true of very wealthy countries such as the Scandinavian ones and of middle-income countries such as Argentina and Uruguay. 

This is reflected in the following table taken from the classic work made by Angus Maddison.
Table number 1

Total Government Expenditure as % of GDP at Current Prices









Source; The World Economy, a Millennial Perspective, Maddison, OCDE (2001)	


In a way, the egalitarian aim that we accept as valid when it comes to redistributing abundance has been distorted into an unquestionable acceptance of a trade-off between greater equality and attacks or limitations on freedom. It is a simple but relevant point: upon the arrival of abundance, the implementation of inefficient redistributive policies is increasingly accepted but, then, we assume (or maybe are confused) that there is also a stock of freedoms that are broad enough to abuse them and not create problems for individual rights.

2)	The European Project as a Spontaneous Order

According to Hayek, spontaneous orders reflect the fallibility of human nature. An order is spontaneous when two or more people interact due to a specific motive but the consequences of that interaction contribute to the creation of situations and scenarios that are impossible for them to imagine and plan ex ante. For example, when people started communicating, they started naming certain objects and situations without knowing that, in a way, they were contributing to the development of a language​[1]​. 

It is difficult to research some systematic literature about the European Project as a spontaneous order. We can quote a rigorous article made by Professor Martin Hesselink, “A Spontaneous Order for Europe? Why Hayek's Libertarianism is Not the Right Way Forward for European Private Law”. However, the article does not focus in the whole European Project but in a particular and precise (even private) sphere.  

“The Economist” gives a concise definition: “What it means to say that an order is spontaneous is simply to say its stable macro-level patterns—those things that make a complex system a system, an instance of order rather than disorder or randomness—do not come about through design, planning or imposition, but arise instead from the interaction of micro-level elements operating according to certain basic principles or rules. The order that arises spontaneously from markets, whereby prices are allowed to fluctuate freely with supply and demand, is a natural wonder admired by libertarians and non-libertarians alike. The idea that the world sometimes works this way is neither silly or harmful”​[2]​. 

Professor Peter Boettke, a sophisticate scholar in the libertarian tradition, develops an impressive introduction to Hayek’s spontaneous order approach in “The Theory of Spontaneous Order and Cultural Evolution in the Social Theory of F. A. Hayek”. 

In this way, the European Union has become a contemporary and sophisticated example of spontaneous order. To think of Europe as a spontaneous order makes us consider both the strength of the process and the limitations of potential attempts at future integration in other regions of the world. The construction of Europe is a spontaneous order and, as such, it is unrepeatable and unequalled. 

Thus, abundance places pressure on freedoms and “equalities.” How do modern societies face this unprecedented type of pressures? Which institutional arrangements are better positioned to deal with this challenge? Spontaneous orders include tacit mechanisms of checks and balances that are capable of dealing with this problem. The European Project is the best example of it. 

The main cause of the 2008 crisis is the inefficient use of abundance, more than greed. This new and unprecedented form of abundance must create new mechanisms of checks and balances. The “traditional” mechanisms are most likely insufficient. We must come up with new mechanisms so this unprecedented form of abundance does not establish new abuses or limits on freedom. Contrary to a widespread perception, it is very possible that the institutional arrangement that is best-equipped to create new and efficient mechanisms of checks and balances be the European Project. This belief lies in the aforementioned ability of spontaneous orders to create mechanisms that are impossible to foresee and plan ex ante.

The European Project has built and broadened rights and freedoms. Even though in some cases this has been explicit and has been planned in formal institutional spheres, there are freedoms and equalities that only unplanned actions can create and strengthen. The European project has created a sophisticated mechanism of tacit –that is, unplanned- checks and balances.

On the other hand, it is possible to think of equality as a tacit mechanism of checks and balances. The most egalitarian societies are more cohesive and this also implies that there is a tacit or spontaneous mechanism that controls power. However, this only occurs when specific policies create equality, not when it is planned from above, because in this case, that hypothetical equality would conspire against freedom.

The European Project as a Spontaneous Order:  Conflict, Consensus, and Diversity
Political societies have different levels of conflict, consensus, and dissent. Conflict implies an open argument over a specific issue among two or more voices with opposing views. Consensus implies an agreement on one or more specific measures among two or more political forces. Dissension is halfway between conflict and consensus. It implies that even though two or more forces have not come to an agreement, they have not turned the dissension into an open conflict that would eventually lead to a zero sum game.
However, we can divide dissension in two camps that represent two different –and to a certain degree, opposite- analytical views. On the one hand, we have dissension as a precursor of conflict, and it implies that the actors involved are willing to confront each other in the median term in order to impose their view. On the other hand, we have civilized dissension or diversity. Diversity does not pose a problem to the polis; in fact, it improves it by offering different views on a same problem or issue.
Which is the main political and analytical characteristic of diversity? It is being a mechanism of checks and balances for the established political powers. Following Hayek, we can think of diversity as the form of dissension that implies a spontaneous mechanism of control over the existing political and economic system. The most significant contemporary experience is the European Project or the idea of Europe. Even though it was originally conceived as a political mechanism to avoid future confrontations between historically belligerent countries, the European Union has become a construction whose primary meaning and strength lies in the diversity of its parts. Thanks to this diversity, the parts (countries and regions) complement and control each other. None of the founders of the Union conjured this mechanism of control– it is a spontaneous mechanism generated by a process that no person or group of people could possibly direct. 
The European Project has forged its strength in a political community that experiences conflicts, consensuses, and dissensions. Dissensions are the diverse ways different “modi vivendi” express their singularity. And the strengthening of these singularities has become the bedrock on which the idea of Europe has been built. For example, the pursuit of a common Constitution was an attempt to achieve a consensus on a wide range of values and conditions​[3]​. 
So far, it has failed. This impossibility or difficulty to achieve a consensus illustrates how the strength of the idea of Europe lies not only in consensuses, but also –and mainly– in (increasingly) civilized dissensions or diversity.  From this analytical perspective, we see that the greater the diversity or civilized dissension, the greater the strength of the European experience. In this sense, given that the idea of Europe entails the pursuit of consensus and diversity, we can quote a thought that the economist Dani Rodrik takes from Bob Kuttner:
 “Reading Adam Smith in Copenhagen -- the center of the small, open, and highly successful Danish economy -- is a kind of out-of-body experience. On the one hand, the Danes are passionate free traders. They score well in the ratings constructed by pro-market organizations (such as the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index)... Denmark's financial markets are clean and transparent, its barriers to imports minimal, its labor markets the most flexible in Europe, its multinational corporations dynamic and largely unmolested by industrial policies, and its unemployment rate are one of the lowest in the OECD (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)…On the other hand, Denmark spends about 50 percent of its GDP on public outlays and has one of  the world's highest tax rate; strong trade unions; and one of the world's most equal income distributions. For the half of GDP that they pay in taxes, the Danes get not just universal health insurance but also generous child-care and family-leave arrangements, unemployment compensation that typically covers around 95 percent of lost wages, free higher education, secure pensions in old age, and the world's most creative system of worker retraining
…Does Denmark have some secret formula that combines the best of Adam Smith with the best of the Welfare State? Is there something culturally unique about the open-minded Danes? Can a model like the Danish one survive as a social democratic island in a turbulent sea of globalization, where unregulated markets tend to swamp mixed economic systems? What does Denmark have to teach the rest of the industrial world? ... The answers are complex and often counterintuitive”​[4]​.  
Kuttner’s question addresses not only Denmark but also Scandinavia. The fact that a market economy that assigns resources can complement a Welfare State that efficiently universalizes the benefits of that efficient assignment reveals that certain mechanisms are not only compatible but also enhance the different virtues. The cohesive Scandinavian societies are efficient because they presuppose universality and, to a certain extent, they aim at universality because they assign resources efficiently. The market and the state form a virtuous circle. However, this cannot be transferred to other institutional arrangements because, following Hayek, this virtuous complementation involves tacit knowledge that only the parties in question have, and it is not possible for them to transmit that information even if they wanted to.
As Kuttner notes: “With appropriate caveats, Danish ideas can indeed be instructive for other nations grappling with the enduring dilemma of how to reconcile market dynamism with social and personal security. Yet Denmark's social compact is the result of a century of political conflict and accommodation that produced a consensual style of problem solving that is uniquely Danish. It cannot be understood merely as a technical policy fix to be swallowed whole in a different cultural or political context. Those who would learn from Denmark must first appreciate that social models have to grow in their own political soil”​[5]​.

The European Project as a Spontaneous Order: In Praise of Social Democracy
From what standpoint can one praise and defend a political ideology? On the one hand, one can obviously do so from the same ideological standpoint. However, one can also do so from a different ideological standpoint. For example, we can praise and defend the virtues of Social Democracy from a liberal standpoint. Defending Social Democracy implies sharing certain principles.
Apart from implying that the two political views can find common ground, it also implies that when Social Democracy is praised from a liberal standpoint (and when Liberalism might possibly be praised from a social democratic standpoint) we are asking ourselves if we can build or rediscover new empathies. 
If A and B are two political ideologies, we can find common ground in C. However, a liberal praise for Social Democracy would imply an analytical attempt at building D. Moreover, it would analytically aim at building successive Ds. But first, how should we define C? As the political sphere or place that is merely a concession between parties that stems from a negotiation between actors with diverse and opposing interests. How should we define D? As the political and analytical sphere that does not result from a tacit nor explicit negotiation between A and B. Rather, it is a tacit construction (that may or may not include C) of a completely new sphere. Ex ante, its hypothetical existence was impossible to foresee. In this sense, we could consider D a sphere that is a result of a spontaneous order. 
In other words, A’s praise for B not only helps find a point C (or successive Cs) but also becomes the path to build D and successive Ds. In this way, Liberalism’s praise for Social Democracy (or Social Democracy’s praise for Liberalism) implies the analytical advantage of overcoming a status quo that only projected the building of consensuses around C.
We must note that D only appears when the dialogue between A and B stems from common ground and from one’s analytical praise for the other. That is to say, while C is a neutral place where different standpoints may sporadically coincide, D and successive Ds are common spheres where the parties not only tolerate each other’s differences but also understand and celebrate those differences. The celebration of differences is not a late romantic expression of contemporary political philosophy. It reflects the core of the idea of Europe and the European Project.
For the majority, true public life implies a constant strain of complex, diverse, and opposing interests. Although we consider this to be a valid premise, we can imagine a sphere D where conflict fades (but does not disappear) because its existence stems from an unprecedented type of dialogue between different political standpoints. As mentioned above, while the traditional political dialogue between A and B translates into successive Cs, liberalism’s praise for Social Democracy opens the analytical and political doors to D and successive Ds.
However, a political standpoint that celebrates the virtues of other standpoints must respect democracy and commit to some form of liberal democracy. Contemporary European social democratic and liberal voices have managed to coexist by jointly defining the scope and limits of the Welfare State. This coexistence is at times virtuous and at times problematic. Liberalism’s praise for Social Democracy is partly an attempt at highlighting a basic analytical coincidence both traditions share: freedom and equality as essentially complementary and mutually necessary ideas.
In 1957, no one could foresee the peculiar empathy that the European project would generate among its members (defined as countries and also regions, groups, and people). As mentioned above, a distinctive characteristic of this Hayekian spontaneous order that Europe has become is the emergence of C and D as common ground. D is a sphere of common ground and negotiation that unknowingly generates successful spontaneous orders. D is a sphere that Europe has and that no other commercial, political, or military agreement in the world can have. Whereas other countries and regions negotiate by means of successive Cs when faced with different types of crises, the European project has built different Ds. For example, the ubiquitous negotiation between Greece and the troika is a traditional C sphere. It would be mistaken to imply that the European project could lose strength due to (potentially insoluble) problems in some C sphere.
To summarize what we have stated so far: two or more actors share common ground in C and D. C represents a sphere of tolerance and D represents a sphere of diversity. Then, diversity is not only expressed in sphere D but in successive Ds as well. The European project has tacitly bolstered the emergence of different Ds, created by the interaction between parties – an interaction that was impossible to foresee ex ante.
From a viewpoint of contemporary political philosophy, one can think of the European project as a critical dialogue between John Rawls and John Gray. On the one hand, Rawls develops a research program starting with his well-known, 1971 book “A Theory of Justice” and ending with his last book published in 1999, “The Laws of Peoples.” The analytical bridge that joins them is “Political Liberalism,” written in 1993. Rawls begins his research program by elaborating a theory of universal justice, based on a view that champions individual rights. “Political Liberalism” focuses his theory of justice on Western democracies. And finally, “The Laws of Peoples” recognizes the political and ethical possibility of the existence of decent poleis that do not share his principles of justice but, even so, can and must be tolerated. The European project is a clear example of the Rawlsian aim that is spelled out in “The Laws of Peoples.” Both his 1993 and 1999 works were tacitly meant to answer criticisms of the (Rawlsian) idea of the Self that Communitarianism had formulated in the 80s and 90s. 
The European project has been established as an analytical sphere where this tradition of criticism can take place. As mentioned above, the European project is made up of a series of intra- and supra-national modi vivendi. Discussions about the roles that certain communities play (or should play) has enriched the construction of the European project​[6]​.
Contemporary liberal democracies have created a tacit C sphere where different views or types of freedom and equality coexist and complement each other. Within that C sphere of (partial) consensus, European liberal democracies have managed to reconcile societies that are moving into wider circles of freedom and equality. We can illustrate this with the aforementioned example of the Scandinavian societies where we find Welfare States that have designed (inclusive and egalitarian) universal policies that have complemented the spheres of autonomy and free will of individuals. 
Therefore, one of the traditional tensions between freedom and equality has been refuted by the contemporary Scandinavian experience. There, the emergence and consolidation of a Welfare State has not set limits on individual autonomy but, on the contrary, has contributed to create spheres for Cs and Ds in which freedom and equality mutually reinforce each other.
When we think of D, we are thinking of expressions or modi vivendi that go beyond mere agreements, no matter how complex these agreements may be. The Scandinavian Welfare States’ versatility for reforms and their ability to consolidate them reflect political and cultural expressions that place them on a path between different Cs and Ds. In this praise of Social Democracy  from a liberal standpoint, we focus on a specific form of D in the contemporary modus vivendi: the European project or idea of Europe.
Diversity as a relevant characteristic in developed countries (especially European countries) has an obvious component: one is diverse within an institutional framework that allows differences. In this sense, diversity and consensus are necessarily complementary spheres. Where does each society’s particular diversity come from? From the process of discovery that individual actors go through within institutional frameworks that differ from one another. As stated by Dani Rodrik, recipes for economic growth and prosperity can differ greatly from one country to another and the idea of the “Washington Consensus” has reflected its promoters’ noticeable ignorance of history. The Copenhagen consensus reflects one (and only one) of the ways that developed societies achieve consensuses to implement certain public policies and how, in turn, this broad sphere of consensus creates a public sphere where diversity flourishes and is strengthened.
Why would the impossibility of thinking about liberal democracy as a universal value be (merely) a failure? Because, as John Gray states, an essential aspect of liberalism is defining the existence of timeless individual rights. So, if the impossibility of that timelessness is proved, that philosophical political view cannot be local. In other words, it would be universal or nothing at all. Following this logic, liberalism as a local expression would be a contradiction or oxymoron. Even though Gray developed this position in his last analytical stage, he had previously developed a more convincing alternative. The two faces of liberalism could be expressed in two opposing philosophies: tolerance as a means or tolerance a value in itself. As stated by Gray: 
“Liberal toleration has contributed immeasurably to human well-being. Nowhere so deep-rooted that it can be taken for granted, it is an achievement that cannot be valued too highly.  We cannot do without that early modern ideal; but it cannot be our guide in late modern circumstances. For the ideal of toleration we have inherited embodies two incompatible philosophies. Viewed from one side, liberal toleration is the ideal of a rational consensus on the best way of life. From the other, it is the belief that human beings can flourish in many ways of life…If liberalism has a future, it is in giving up the search for a rational consensus on the best way of life…Liberalism has always had two faces. From one side, toleration is the pursuit of an ideal form of life. From the other, it is the search for terms of peace among different ways of life. In the former view, liberal institutions are seen as applications of universal principles. In the latter, they are the means to peaceful coexistence. In the first, liberalism is a prescription for a universal regime. In the second, it is a project of coexistence that can be pursued in many regimes”​[7]​. 

In second place, we ask: why would the impossibility of liberalism as a universal project be an opportunity? Because it would create incentives to think about the positive analytical and political aspects of different local and regional developments. If liberalism is one of many modi vivendi, the real dimension of its local value will be determined by the ability of those expressions to prosper. We can try to answer the same question from another viewpoint: the impossibility of fulfilling an universal aim does not reflect the limits of liberalism but the limits of the Enlightment Project. Following the same logic, we can consider that the impossibility of fulfilling the universal aim will help liberalism realize that some local particularities have regional manifestations that are unprecedented in modern history. The European project is one of them. For the moment, it is the most sophisticated political expression of human virtues. The necessary mention of the European project’s shortcomings and miseries will most likely make it, in part, more human. The European project and the idea of Europe have become a relevant analytical challenge for Grayean philosophy: following its own logic, liberalism not only proves to have a local (and regional) life after a universal death, but also it is headed –with some steps forward and some steps back– towards consolidating a form of good regional life. 
How do spontaneous orders deal with abundance? How has the European project –this peculiar spontaneous order we have identified– dealt with abundance? As mentioned above, the appearance of abundance has redefined the roles of liberty and equality. A growing abundance marginally downplays the importance of an efficient demarcation of property rights and helps to create the erroneous belief that threats to freedoms can never be comparatively greater than the opportunities prosperity has created.

Even though the current European crisis may be interpreted through this unprecedented difficulty of dealing with abundance, the true inverse relationship between economic growth and institutional weakness (or limits to freedoms) has taken place –and most probably will continue to take place–in developing countries. However, the current European crisis is set within the obvious difficulty that complex spontaneous orders have to solve increasingly sophisticated demands. In other words, the European crisis reflects the modern difficulty to deal with abundance, but it also -and not paradoxically- reveals that sophisticated spontaneous orders are the institutional arrangements that are best-able to rethink the issue that is presently in question: how to reveal the true dimension of the danger of this deceitful trade-off between “extreme” prosperity and a supposedly “minimal and marginal” loss of freedoms.

The existence of a stable point of common ground of the broadening of freedoms and economic growth is impossible in China or Russia, for example, in the medium term. But this common ground is particularly possible in the validity of the European project or idea of Europe.

3)	“The Open Society and its Adversaries”

It is relevant to make a note on the current status of the United States. That is, to highlight the strength of the European Project, it is useful to make a brief comment on the comparative American decline. Today, our old acquaintance, “the open society”, openly and explicitly does not have enemies as before. But it is faced by tough and plain-spoken competitors and adversaries.  No one advocates, as in the immediate post-war years, for the disappearance of the “bourgeois democracy” but many politicians, parties and countries practice a supposed “democracy” which, in the best of cases, has the form of an elected authoritarianism.  

It is necessary to emphasize the implications that this new scenario has for liberalism and democracy. For that, it is necessary to first mention the state of one of their main contemporary pillars. There is a great quantity of popular and academic literature referring to the decline of the United States and the change in the global power axis.  For example, Fareed Zakaria has written about the “The Post-American World”, Timothy Garton Ash about “Free World: America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West”, John Ikenberry published in 2011 “Liberal Leviathan, the origins, crisis and transformation of the American world order”, the provocative Scottish historian Naill Ferguson wrote “Civilization, the West and the Rest”, among many others. These authors analyze the implications of the West’s relative growing weakness. Liberal democracy as a universal project would seem to have collapsed. 

To understand the complicated reality that the West will face in the short-medium term, we can attempt to compare the pre-American world, the American world and the post American world. The Pre-American world was the period between the wars (what Ernst Nolte called “The European Civil War”). That world was led by a complicated constellation of liberal democracies, some growing (USA) and others shrinking (Great Britain, France and in a certain sense, Germany). The real or emerging threats were significant but clearly defined. Liberal Democracy faced two colossal threats politically, philosophically, ethically and militarily. The growing Fascism and Communism already installed between 1922 and 1989 represented vital threats but not complicated since they were “predictable”. That open society faced enemies “totally” understandable since, as we said, they openly and brutally expressed their objections to liberal democracy.     

On the other hand, the “post-American” world confronts the West and the liberal democracies with less obvious and brutal democracies but, as a result, more complex. For example, the brutality of the current Chinese regime with their citizens is not necessarily less but it is more complicated and, at a point, could be considered as more “sophisticated”. Where could this greater sophistication lie? In part, it is possible to maintain that the classical totalitarian State (such as the Nazis or Soviets) expressed themselves practically exclusively through the State Apparatus. There, civil society found itself so weak that they only served as transmitters or repeaters of the absolute will of the State apparatus. 

As mentioned, these dynamics were simple and predictable in their close to elemental cruelty. There was nothing particularly sophisticated in the State-Society dynamics. Although scientific advances were made during Germany’s Nazi period and particularly in the Soviet Union (for example, in the field of nuclear physics and space technology), that complexity was developed strictly within the area of the respective science. There was certain socio-political interaction between that scientific development sector and the party/state system. The relationship was simple, direct and asymmetrical: the political apparatus “made use” of these developments for their own purposes. However, the 1934 German society or the Soviet one of 1953 had little or nothing to do with those scientific advances.

On the other hand, in totalitarian contemporary China, the relationship between the State apparatus and the Civil Society is certainly more complex in a relevant analytical sense. Although it is true that today’s Chinese civil society also finds itself placed asymmetrically with respect to the use of the knowledge that the Party and the State can do, these two political actors can no longer radically exclude the population from the transformations that is taking place. Partly because the information society has changed the rules of the game and partly because the Chinese totalitarianism has lost a great part of its initial “ideological” intensity but in fact, the Chinese society receives some type of retransmission of the significance of the policies that the state implements and that in a way has weakened the “gap” existing between the two abovementioned totalitarianisms.  

When doing it, this new scenario has managed to achieve that the policies of totalitarian state appear as if “accompanied” by a relatively broad bureaucratic consensus. An example is the insertion of Chinese state companies in different markets around the world. When a Chinese company becomes a shareholder in an oil or mining company in Brazil or Mexico, it manages to transcend its real role (which is none other than the totalitarian Chinese state entering the oil or mining business in Brazil or Mexico) and presenting itself as a relatively legitimate expression of the Chinese civil society. 






In the face of growing prosperity, some actors are willing to tolerate marginal limits to freedom. The current European crisis (reflected, for example, in the tension between Germany and Greece) may be more of a result of a poor understanding of past abundance than of the inability to face the current scarcity.

Over the last decade, we have once again begun to tolerate a line of reasoning that we had previously discarded: in the face of a certain level of economic growth, there are violations of freedom that could be tolerated. Obviously, this is not a new idea; but in this context of extreme abundance, it has been given a cynical twist: Western democracy has failed as a universal aim and therefore the United States, the European Union, and the West have no moral authority to meddle in, for example, China’s or Russia’s domestic issues. The best-known trade-off between economic growth and individual liberties has been, of course, the contemporary Chinese experience.

Is the Rule of Law solely a country’s internal problem? In the last decade there have been an abundant number of indexes that provided comparative information regarding transparency, human development, political stability, rule of law or regulatory quality between countries. 

We observe that in 1980, USA represented 24.9%, Latin America 11.44%, the European Union 30.87%  and China 2% of the global GDP. This means that in 1980 China’s economy was equal to 8.43% of USA’s economy and 6.47% of EU’s economy. In 2010 it was 67.2% of USA’s and 665 of EU’s economy and in 2015 China will be equal to 87.4% of USA’s and 92.2% of EU’s economy. This change in the world’s power equation is the most relevant contemporary geopolitical variable.
In 1980, the combined USA and European economies represented 51.4% of global GDP and by 2015 37%, a drop of 14.4%. Meanwhile, China’s rose from 2% in 1980 to 16.9% in 2015, an increase of 14.9%. This shows an inverse relationship between USA and Europe’s diminished incidence in the global GDP and China’s increase. Indeed, if we had to summarize how to justify the deterioration in the quality of Rule of Law, we could do so based on this inverse relationship.  
In the analysis of this complicated intertwining that has developed in the last decades between the West and their new “challengers”, that for simplicities sake we will call “East”, the relationship has become very complex.  The relative decline of the West not only reflects the East’s capability, particularly China’s, of incorporating and taking over the “Liberal’s Project” most suitable institutions (following Niall Ferguson’s “Civilization, the West and the Rest”, we can mention competition, science, the Rule of Law, modern medicine, consumerism, and the work ethic.). It’s possible to conclude that in part the Western decline has an “other way round” effect: the East’s “capability” of exporting their “bad institutions” to the West, their profound lack of democratic tradition, their economy that fluctuates between state interventionism and mafia type practices of party bureaucracies, the brutality of repressive customs and their more than doubtful ancestral commercial practices of the Chinese Diaspora.

Surprising as it may seem, this could be a promising subject of research. The rapid accumulation of power by the East, not only can be explained by their capacity of importing new good institutions, but more so, the West’s inability of avoiding the importation of classical authoritarianism’s bad institutions.

We can raise the issue from another angle that can be useful for future research. If we admit that trade between two countries is not only the exchange of goods and services but also, exchange of “institutions”. For example, when a country like USA, Germany  or Norway trade with China or when the West trades with the East, one exports and the other imports goods and services but both, at the same time, export and import institutions. An institutional exchange process is generated whose paths and effects would be worthwhile exploring. USA exports its good institutions (as well as some bad ones) and imports bad Chinese institutions (as well as some good ones). Obviously the reasoning also applies to China.
The question is whether the traffic or “contamination” of good and bad institutional practices, could it have accelerated the rise of one and the decline of the other? It is a question that merits careful analysis.  If it were true that with each commercial exchange, one country exports and another imports goods or services but more importantly, both countries export and import institutions, we could conclude that the East’s accelerated ascent and the West’s decline could partly be due to this (double) exchange that we have outlined.

It is possible to explore the hypothesis that the relative process of rise and descent between these two paradigmatic countries of two large regions of the contemporary globalized world, has accelerated because the exchanges are, on one hand, commercial and institutional but on the other, the institutional exchanges and, above all, their effects, are even greater than suspected and their repercussions must be explored beyond the simple figures of commercial exchange.  Are we sure that it is innocuous and irrelevant  for  the quality of USA’s and Europe’s economic and institutional development that leading and emblematic companies such as Apple, Volvo, Airbus, Nike and Google have access to production mechanisms, to forms of exploitation of child labor and to violation of environmental regulations in the Orient and in Africa that are strictly prohibited in Western societies?  To the contrary: are we sure that the quality, sanitary, commercial presentation, chemical innocuousness that the USA and Europe impose on many products imported from China, are not generating changes, both technological and institutional, within the Chinese society?  

Therefore, though the European Project is mainly an institutional structure it is necessary to start to think of the geopolitical relevance that this unique institutional project could have for the enforcement of human rights in the world. Europe as a political project (and the idea of Europe as a symbolic project) will have to play a crucial role as checks and balance of an essentially anti-liberal modus vivendi that is spreading and consolidating in the world because it is contributing to greater economic prosperity.

Again, the increased exchange between China and the rest of the world is not only on goods and services but also in institutions. Although the terms of trade have improved notably in the last decade for the poor and emerging African and Latin American countries, we need to develop a yardstick that tells us how much the institutions or Rule of Law of these countries have deteriorated, as a result of increased trading with China.  The problem faced is that although it is simple to measure how much trade has increased as well as the price of certain products (mainly commodities), it is difficult to measure how much this increase has affected the current and more importantly, future institutions of these countries.  

According to David Dollar and Aart Kraay, “The world has become a much smaller place over the past two decades. International trade has grown twice as fast as worldwide income during this period. Spurred by advances in information technology, a growing share of this trade is in services rather than merchandise, especially among rich countries. International direct and portfolio equity investment has also surged tremendously during the same period.”​[8]​ This point seems to be very relevant. For the authors, a smaller world should make possible that through trade, pressure can be exerted on countries that do not respect basic human rights because if they do not conform to a liberal modus vivendi, they will be excluded from an increasingly interdependent world.  Nevertheless, it is also necessary to argue from an opposite angle: in an increasingly interdependent world economy, not only will the liberal countries have a greater impact on the ones that do not respect basic human rights but simultaneously, these will have a greater influence on the first.   






Dollar, David and Aart Kraay. “Trade, Growth and Poverty”, in  Finance and Development (a Quarterly Magazine of the IMF). September 2001, Volume 38, number 3.

Gray, John. “Two Faces of Liberalism”, The New Press. 2000. 

Gray, John. “Liberalism”, second edition.  University of Minnesota. 1995.

Gray, John. “Post-Liberalisms: Studies in Political Thought”, Routledge. 2003.

Ferguson, Naill.  “Civilization. The west and the rest”, Pinguin Press. 2011
Garton Ash, Timothy. “Free World: America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West”, Random House. 2004.
Garton Ash, Timothy Historia del presente, ensayos, retratos y crónicas de la Europa de los 90”, Tusquets. 2000.
Hayek, Friedrich.  “The Constitution of Liberty”, the University of Chicago Press. 1960.
Hayek, Friedrich. “The Sensory Order, An Inquiry into the Foundation of Theoretical Psychology”, the University of Chicago Press. 1952.
Ikenberry, John. “Liberal Leviathan, the origins, crisis and transformation of the American world order”, Princenton University Press. 2011.
Joffe, Josef. "The Myth of the America´s Decline. Politics, Economics and a Half Century of false Prophecies", North & Company Inc. 2013.

Freedom House. “Freedom in the World”. Reports. Available online at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports (​http:​/​​/​www.freedomhouse.org​/​reports​)

Kuttner, Robert: “The Copenhagen Consensus. Reading Adam Smith in Denmark” in, Foreign Affairs March/April 2008

Maddison, Angus. The Millennial Perspective (online). Available online at:  http://www.theworldeconomy.org/ (​http:​/​​/​www.theworldeconomy.org​/​​).


North, Douglass, John Wallis, Barry Weingast: "Violence and Social Orders. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History ". Cambridge University Press. 2009.

North Douglass. “Institutions, Institutional changes and economic performance”, Cambridge University Press. 1990.

Nolte, Ernst. “La guerra civil europea. 1917-1945”, Fondo de Cultura Económica. México. 2011.

Popper, Karl. “La sociedad abierta y sus enemigos”, Planeta-Agostini. 1992

Rawls, John, “A Theory of Justice”, Harvard University Press. 1999

Rawls, John, “Political Liberalism”, Columbia University Press. 1996.

Rawls, John, “The Law of Peoples”, Harvard University Press. 1999





Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. Available online at: http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu​/​about-eu​/​institutions-bodies​/​court-justice​/​index_en.htm​)

Tullock, Gordon: “The origin rent-seeking concept”, International Journal of Business and Economics, 2003, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1-8

V-Dem, Varieties of Democracy. Measuring Degress&Types of Democracy. Available online at:https://v-dem.net/ y https://v-dem.net/about.

World Bank S.d. “Economic Growth in the 1990´s”. Available online at:
http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons1990s/chaps/01-Ch01.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www1.worldbank.org​/​prem​/​lessons1990s​/​chaps​/​01-Ch01.pdf​)

World Economic Forum. Available online at: http://www.weforum.org/reports (​http:​/​​/​www.weforum.org​/​reports​)










^1	  Hayek started his research on spontaneous orders earlier than previously thought. His (tacit) pioneer work is “The Sensory Order”, an opaque draft written by then the student of Psychology, the young Friedrich Hayek . Hayek’s best-known book, “The Constitution of Liberty”, is a good introduction although not necessarily a sophisticate approach to the meaning of spontaneous orders. 
^2	  For a further analysis, see The Economist, http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/09/hayek-and-libertarianism.
^3	  The German philosopher Jurgen Habermas reflects on the European project and identity in a broadcast interview. See http://www.signandsight.com/features/1265.html 
In addition, Habermas has written about the need for a European Constitution in: http://www.signandsight.com/features/1265.html
^4	  Rodrik, Dani, taken from Kuttner, Robert: “The Copenhagen Consensus. Reading Adam Smith in Denmark,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008. In addition, a variety of papers on the discussion about the benefits of the Nordic model for Continental Europe  can be found at:
http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/conferences/nordic/nordic_papers.html
^5	  Kuttner  Robert. Op cit.
^6	  To think of Europe as a spontaneous order contributes not only to reassess the value of the project but also to understand the structural limitations the remaining integration processes had in the past, have at present, and will likely have in the future. The European project has re-defined the meaning of “Rule of Law” because it has tacitly included the informal checks represented by regions and countries in such a supra-national project.
^7	  This paragraph is just the beginning of the fascinating book “Two Faces of Liberalism”. Chapter 1, liberal toleration. Page 3.
^8	  Dollar, David and Aart Kraay (2002): “Trade, Growth and Poverty”, in  Finance and Development (a Quarterly Magazine of the IMF). September 2001, Volume 38, number 3
